The article examines the identification procedure as one of the most complex and vulnerable investigative actions in criminal proceedings. The scientific problem lies in the absence of an integrated approach to assessing the reliability of identification results that would combine legal, forensic, and cognitive perspectives. The study emphasizes that procedural formalism often fails to ensure evidentiary accuracy when the cognitive mechanisms of perception and memory are disregarded, leading to distortions and suggestive influences that undermine the objectivity of identification. The purpose of the article is to deepen the theoretical understanding of identification as a cognitive-legal process, to clarify the concept of objectivity, and to develop scientific criteria for evaluating the reliability and admissibility of its results. The author argues that identification should be viewed not merely as a procedural act but as a complex interaction of psychological, legal, and evidentiary factors requiring interdisciplinary safeguards. The research employs systemic-structural, formal-legal, cognitive-psychological, and comparative-legal methods. The novelty lies in integrating cognitive science findings into the legal framework, allowing for the identification of regularities in the formation, storage, and recall of visual images. Comparative analysis of foreign practice reveals the effectiveness of «double-blind» and «sequential» identification methods in minimizing suggestive influence. The results show that reliability depends on the neutrality of the procedure and the cognitive independence of the identifying person. Repeated exposure or prior demonstration of objects distorts memory and violates the principle of single testing. The study introduces the concept of «cognitive objectivity» the ability of the procedure to preserve the authenticity of memory free from external influence and justifies the need to develop cognitive safety standards for investigative actions. It is concluded that ensuring the truthfulness of identification requires moving beyond formal admissibility toward cognitively grounded evidentiary assessment, harmonizing procedural guarantees with the psychological mechanisms of human memory